Delay in Lab-Grown Virus Ban Raises Concerns
The Trump administration has pushed back the deadline for prohibiting lab-grown pandemic viruses by over eight weeks, causing alarm among biosafety advocates and contradicting previous assurances from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) regarding policy progress.
A presidential order from May instructed several agency leaders to develop new federal guidelines on gain-of-function (GOF) research by September 2.
Sean Kaufman, CEO of the biosafety consultancy Safer Behaviors, expressed frustration, saying, “COVID-19 is splitting atoms in biology, but no one seems to be talking about it with any urgency.” This sentiment resonates with many who worry about the implications of ongoing research.
This issue has long been a concern for Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who contends that collaboration between NIH and the Wuhan Institute of Virology led to new coronavirus infections among NIH staff—a viewpoint that has faced strong opposition from others, including NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya. Anthony Fauci’s defense of his inner circle has sparked a sense of déjà vu for some observers.
As of now, the 120-day deadline has passed, albeit slightly due to a government shutdown triggered by budget disputes among Democrats. This halt has hindered policy progress.
Bhattacharya commented during a lecture at a May White House signing ceremony responding to the GOF Executive Order, indicating that the new rules “permanently repeal” previous measures. Interestingly, on his podcast in August, he softened his tone, noting that GOF can sometimes be “very important.”
In 2016, NIH officials managed to seize control of GOF regulations away from the White House, leading to policies that scrutinized only a limited number of projects. Emails suggest that individuals involved in drafting pre-coronavirus policies to fund research in Wuhan are now directly influencing Trump’s current guidelines.
Some experts worry about the vagueness of Trump’s campaign rhetoric. They fear it might delegate much of the policymaking authority to agency heads, such as those at NIH, and enforce penalties, including a five-year ban on a sizable portion of grants.
When approached for a comment, an HHS spokesperson redirected inquiries to the White House, which did not respond to requests.
Staffing Changes and Controversy
Recent staffing changes may shed light on the policy delays. Gerald Parker, who led the drafting of the executive order, has reportedly resigned for personal reasons. The OSTP has since welcomed back Anna Paglisi, a counterintelligence expert focusing on Chinese technology.
Paglisi’s stance on GOF remains unclear, although she has previously highlighted concerns over China’s disregard for global biological weapon norms. She suggested that regulators should balance risks associated with both under-regulation and over-regulation.
Paglisi did not respond to requests for comment and, notably, her email address was not easily found online.
Recently, NIH terminated three of Bhattacharya’s advisers after a DCNF report revealed that one defended GOF research—contrary to Trump’s stance.
Lyric Jorgenson, serving as the NIH’s deputy director for science policy, is currently handling the draft GOF policy. She had previously led the drafting of Biden’s GOF guidelines, which elicited criticism.
Additionally, HHS appears to have dissolved the office responsible for biosecurity within the ASPR, transferring more authority to Jorgenson’s department.
Bhattacharya continues to elevate the work of Jeffrey Taubenberger, who, as a long-time advocate of GOF research, will significantly influence its implementation.
Past Patterns Repeating?
Back in the summer of 2016, the OSTP and National Security Council proposed evaluating GOF projects against specific public health criteria, stressing the need for ethical justification and considering safer alternatives. Yet, alarm signals were evident at the NIH.
By the fall, NIH’s Office of Science Policy promoted a competing set of guidelines that safeguarded HHS’s oversight. Key figures like Fauci and former NIH Director Francis Collins pushed against the White House’s stricter proposals.
Ultimately, the NIH succeeded in reinforcing its aggressive policies, even as some lower-level staff struggled for oversight on GOF projects.
Emails disclosed later revealed that during the week of July 4, NIH became aware of certain GOF research activities in Wuhan but failed to conduct appropriate national security evaluations.
This kind of pattern, where essential discussions get sidelined, is echoed today, especially with the ongoing debates surrounding biosecurity.
In light of the significant death toll from the pandemic, scientists continue to advocate for greater independent oversight to ensure responsible research practices.
Post-2016, a new executive order issued in May 2025 replaced earlier, stricter ones, which had included immediate and permanent bans on certain activities.
