May/June 2026 Insights on North Korea

In the upcoming May/June 2026 issue of Foreign Affairs, John H. Park and Victor Cha, both seasoned voices in Washington’s foreign policy circles, present a rather bleak outlook. Park’s piece, “How Did North Korea Win?” suggests that Kim Jong Un has achieved a “strange victory” through his nuclear advancements, evasion of sanctions, and fostering ties with both Russia and China. Cha echoes this sentiment, advocating for a “cold peace” where denuclearization seems a distant objective, urging the U.S. to make concessions regarding nuclear discussions and accept coexistence with a nuclear North Korea.

This kind of defeatism isn’t new; it’s a narrative that has been repeated for years. President Donald Trump outright rejected these ideas during his initial term and continues to do so. He aims for North Korea’s denuclearization, yet he’s not inclined to engage with the current approach. The notion that Kim has “won” isn’t an insightful analysis—it’s merely a rationale for weakness.

Failures of Appeasement

My recent book, North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office, details how discussions like those from Park and Cha reflect a bipartisan consensus that has allowed North Korea’s arsenal to grow from nonexistent to approximately 50 warheads. There’s ample fissile material available for numerous missile tests and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with the potential to strike the American mainland. Their proposed solution? Essentially, we should learn to coexist with this threat, lower expectations, and agree to more arms control measures to placate North Korea.

Additionally, the credibility of Cha and Park seems questionable. Back in 2018, the Trump administration’s potential decision to name Cha as U.S. ambassador to South Korea fell through, reportedly due to his opposition to the administration’s tough stance on North Korea. Park served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and later as a senior official on North Korean issues, which may explain their articles’ tendency to gloss over how former President Biden’s weak foreign policy empowered North Korea, evident during 2022’s record number of missile tests and provocative actions over Japan, including launching over 70 missiles throughout the year.

The Success of Maximum Pressure

Trump’s approach towards North Korea often proved more effective. His maximum pressure campaign, which included serious sanctions and diplomatic isolation, successfully brought Kim to the negotiating table—a historic first for any North Korean leader. In 2018, for the first time, North Korea ceased nuclear tests, maintaining a testing moratorium until late 2019. During this period, missile launches over Japan and direct threats to the U.S. largely disappeared.

Even Trump was acknowledged for easing tensions and fostering potential pathways toward peace and normalization during this time.

Beyond the Biden Administration

The contrast with the current administration is staggering. North Korea appears to be escalating its missile tests at unprecedented rates while deepening military relations with Russia, providing support to Ukraine, and sharing advanced technologies. The apparent trade partnerships with China continue to flourish as well. This emerging North Korea-Russia alliance complicates any future denuclearization efforts, particularly if Trump were to return to office.

Believing denuclearization is unfeasible overlooks past experiences and the previous administration’s achievements. Treating North Korea as a regular state rather than recognizing its status as a rogue regime with nuclear capabilities was a major misstep. Trump grasped the underlying psychology; strength garners attention, while weakness invites further challenges.

Influence of Ukrainian Dynamics

Park and Cha seem convinced that Kim’s relationship with Russia and China makes any solution impossible. However, Trump’s America First strategy didn’t suggest a solitary resolution to North Korea’s issues. He exerted pressure on China and addressed Russia when necessary. Importantly, concluding the war in Ukraine—something that only Trump could possibly achieve—might be critical in changing the dynamics with North Korea. Cutting off Russian advanced technology could significantly undermine Kim’s position.

A “cold peace” is merely a euphemism for a managed decline. Accepting North Korea’s nuclear status only serves to destabilize Asia, undermining U.S. commitments to allies like South Korea and Japan.

A Clear Path Forward

Trump has reiterated his desire for a deal with Kim, but only if it eliminates the nuclear threat entirely. He’s not interested in superficial agreements that leave American cities at risk. The American public desires strength, not strategies that placate dictators or spell defeat.

It’s not accurate to say Kim Jong-un has “won.” He’s managed to survive by leveraging support from rogue states and exploiting the weaknesses of the current foreign policy establishment. Trump stands ready to counter this threat; a combination of maximum pressure, direct diplomacy, and a firm dedication to denuclearization is essential for true peace. Anything less is simply a disguised surrender.