Recently, many Americans were likely taken aback to learn about the accusations against two Chinese citizens, Yunnkin Jiang and Zunyong Liu. They stand accused of attempting to smuggle a type of fungus into the U.S., which is described as a potential weapon for agroterrorism.
After the Cold War ended, there was a prevailing belief in the U.S. that China posed no real threat, suggests a shift towards democracy and open markets. Yet, that perspective seems misguided. China appears to have ambitious goals of surpassing the U.S. as the leading global economy and military power.
They engage in trade practices that are often inequitable, manipulate their currency, and pressure U.S. companies into technology theft. This creates substantial trade deficits for the U.S., as businesses often prioritize short-term gains over long-term partnerships.
Globally, China seems to exercise its diplomatic influence through economic channels, making infrastructure deals that come with conditions.
Trump’s visa policies have notably impeded China’s ability to gather intelligence on U.S. university campuses and within Congress.
It’s well-known that China conducts espionage; we certainly have our own intelligence operations, but China has a significant advantage due to its vast diaspora in the West. For instance, there are about 280,000 Chinese students in the U.S. compared to fewer than 1,000 American students studying in China. Moreover, roughly 100,000 Americans live in China, and over 2.4 million Chinese residents make their home in the U.S.
Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Act, citizens and organizations are mandated to assist in national intelligence efforts. This gives China a sizable network, from students to permanent residents, enabling them to engage in espionage. Similar to tactics used by Cuba and Russia, they leverage individuals without ethnic ties to the U.S. for intelligence purposes.
There were reports in March 2024 of illegal Chinese individuals entering the Marine Corps Base in Twentynine Palms, California. Though one was apprehended, it raises questions about security at one of our largest military installations. Instances of Chinese nationals approaching or photographing sensitive U.S. sites have been documented over recent years.
Considering the potential for direct conflict with China in the next ten years, the reality is sobering. China is gearing up, while our military struggles with recruitment and modernization. In the event of tensions, China might harness domestic resources to escalate confrontations.
Even a small fraction of the Chinese nationals here could potentially lead to significant harm. Notably, over 25,000 Chinese individuals are reportedly on the run due to issues related to returning to their home country.
In 2024, roughly 78,701 Chinese nationals entered the U.S. illegally, with more than 22,000 doing so in the current fiscal year alone. Visual evidence of illegal entries continues to arise, complicating the situation further.
Moreover, the potential for Chinese influence stretches across critical infrastructure, impacting areas like water and electricity. There’s also the alarming possibility of deliberately spreading dangerous pathogens.
The smuggling of the bioweapon related to the cases of Jiang and Liu highlights the risk to agricultural health and food security. It’s vital to take these threats with utmost seriousness. Historically, the screening processes for Chinese students, businesses, and various other engagements have been overly lenient.
In 2020, Chinese buyers topped the list of foreign investments in U.S. commercial real estate, and reports indicated that in 2021, they owned extensive acreage in the U.S. through shell companies to obscure their origins. Many are notably targeting land near military installations.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration has rolled back or halted measures aimed at safeguarding against Chinese influence. There seems to be a trend of making it easier for illegal immigration cases to proceed, as noted in a recent hearing by the House Homeland Security Committee.
During the Cold War, the U.S. wasn’t making significant land purchases in Russia or allowing foreigners access to sensitive sectors. Why are the standards so different with China?
Customs and border protection have successfully intercepted concealed dangers like fungal injections. What’s crucial now is ensuring that the Department of Homeland Security remains capable and resourced to handle these threats intelligently. While the State Department could benefit from some restructuring, it’s important to safeguard the experiences and skills that help protect American intellectual property and enforce stricter measures against unscreened visitors.
This threat demands our urgent attention.
