Modi’s Recent Visit to China Raises Global Strategic Interest

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trips to China have captured the attention of global strategists. Particularly, some in Washington are wary, interpreting this as a potential thawing of relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which hasn’t happened since 2018.

However, viewing this development solely through a zero-sum lens, as a challenge to U.S. national security, could be a miscalculation. If these two major Asian countries can move past decades of border tensions, accepting compromises and fostering more practical relations, it may serve U.S. interests more effectively.

There’s no need for global anxiety here; a robust trade partnership between China and India could enhance global trade and prosperity. After all, these are two powerful, nuclear-armed nations that have experienced regular skirmishes. The U.S. might find that supporting a multipolar world—including clear roles for both China and India—could be beneficial in this evolving global landscape.

While China-India relations have long been tense, things heated up markedly after the June 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley, where neither side used firearms, leading to significant casualties. This remarkable restraint came alongside New Delhi’s swift reaction, which included severing many diplomatic and economic ties with China. In fact, India took steps ahead of the U.S., implementing strict measures on Chinese companies operating in its markets. To complicate matters, a victory for the Pakistani Air Force against Indian fighters over Kashmir in early summer 2025 added to the tension. Against this backdrop, Modi’s current approach toward China is somewhat surprising.

And then there’s the elephant in the room: Russia. Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in early 2022, New Delhi has steadfastly maintained its relationship with Moscow, even in the face of significant Western pressure. India has benefited from accessing inexpensive Russian energy, essential for a rapidly growing economy that relies heavily on imported oil.

Recently proposed U.S. tariffs on Russian oil imports have led to a slowdown in Indian refiners’ purchases from Russia. Yet, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s recent trip to Moscow, just ahead of the summit in Tianjin, underscores New Delhi’s commitment to bolstering trade between India and Russia.

The idea that Indian military and diplomatic efforts could counterbalance China’s ambitions has gained traction in Washington. True, India has built ties in the defense sector with various Southeast Asian nations and Japan, but the likelihood of direct intervention in U.S.-China military conflicts isn’t realistic. As one expert noted, Washington’s hopes for India stepping into a conflict with China are misguided—New Delhi’s priorities do not include conflicts that don’t threaten its own security.

With India’s defense spending still under 2% of GDP, there’s no pressing urgency felt in New Delhi. The Indian military, heavily reliant on imports, continues to face challenges while China holds a significant military advantage. Given all this, it’s likely that Indian leaders may have decided that escalating militarized competition with China isn’t necessary.

Interestingly, the expansive Himalayan borders could actually lead to productive cooperation between China and India on various issues such as water management, infrastructure, and renewable energy. If China responds positively to India’s more amicable approach, it could lead to discussions about India’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council—a significant step for the world’s most populous nation.

In Washington, some realists have embraced the idea of pitting Beijing against New Delhi, largely driven by misunderstandings related to ideological divides between democracy and authoritarianism. Instead, the U.S. should acknowledge that other major powers have their own interests, which need to be respected for achieving lasting peace and stability.