Judicial Policy and Immigration Law: A Closer Look

Imagine if Donald Trump put on a black robe and weighed in on a tech industry dispute. It’s pretty clear no one would regard his opinion as legally binding. So, why is there this expectation that we should accept judicial decisions on immigration and national security as absolute, particularly when lower courts blatantly disregard rulings from higher courts?

One of the more troubling ideas circulating in American governance is that the Supreme Court reigns supreme over the political branches in every regard. The reality is, its authority is mainly confined to the judicial arena, allowing it to override lower federal courts. The same goes for the Court of Appeals: its rulings are seen as binding on district courts in its circuit.

If lower courts are willing to bypass the attorney general’s decisions, does it really make sense for the president to defer to either of these levels, especially when he’s in the right according to the law?

Increasingly, though, the system seems to operate solely to achieve left-leaning political aims.

On February 6, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed key legal principles: illegal immigrants trying to enter the U.S. don’t possess an inherent right to come in, ask for their release, and then sue for residency while living freely. This court upheld established precedent, citing U.S. immigration law, which dictates that inadmissible aliens should be detained pending the processing of their cases.

Congress included this provision back in 1996 with a straightforward aim: to deter individuals from entering the country illegally, receiving citations, and vanishing into the system.

Now, unlike American criminals who have a right to a bail hearing, illegal immigrants aren’t charged with crimes per se. They are free to leave the country whenever they want, effectively choosing to invade it and then file lawsuits.

And then there was the district court.

A mere three days after the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, Judge Kathleen Cardone from El Paso, appointed by George W. Bush, ordered the release of aliens in five cases, suggesting they had “established roots” in the U.S. What was the purpose of the Fifth Circuit’s decision then? In one case, she declared this court was holding the petitioner in violation of his constitutional due process rights.

Similarly, on February 9, Judge David Briones, another El Paso judge appointed by Bill Clinton, reached a similar conclusion. He claimed that noncitizens who had “established ties” in the U.S. over time deserve freedom from government detention without due process.

Take a moment to consider that.

The Fifth Circuit ruled that detention was required even for aliens who entered the country years ago, yet a district judge concluded this didn’t apply to someone who crossed the border illegally in 2024. It raises questions. How can a district judge argue that the Fifth Circuit overlooked the “constitutional” issue when the Appeals Court’s ruling presupposes that ICE’s actions are constitutional?

These judges selectively pull from the Supreme Court’s opinions regarding aliens with “established relationships,” while neglecting a more extensive body of law asserting that illegal immigrants shouldn’t be able to stay against the state’s wishes. The very concept that someone could invade a country, evade enforcement long enough to build a “bond,” and then use that to shield themselves legally undermines popular sovereignty and the foundational principles of the Declaration.

This also illustrates why the Trump administration struggles against judicial authority. Even if they secure a win in a higher court, lower judges may continue blocking enforcement by framing the same issues in fresh lawsuits. Why should President Trump feel compelled to submit to judges who won’t even defer to their superiors in the judiciary?

This concern was echoed by Ninth Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke, who dissented against the court’s decision to pause the deportation of a Peruvian family pending an appeal. He called the Ninth Circuit a “strange” court, implying that stays on deportations had become routine, even when Supreme Court immigration precedent clearly contradicts this action.

Furthermore, he noted that courts increasingly exploit procedural orders and a wide array of shadow dockets to bypass established precedent without issuing outright contradicting decisions.

He argued that due to the heavy caseload, judges have adopted a “convenient but unwritten practice” of granting preliminary relief as administrative stays pending review, often extending these stays until their merits are resolved. The outcome is a “system of neglect,” making Supreme Court precedents practically meaningless.

Ninth Circuit proponents might argue that the court is overwhelmed and needs to rely on temporary stays. But VanDyke suggests that this leniency seems particularly generous concerning deportation cases. His words paint an amusing picture: it sounds as if the judges are doling out stays akin to a popular talk show host giving away prizes.

“You get a stay!”

(You know the rest.)

That’s the crux of the matter. For many liberal judges, the law often serves merely as a political instrument. They exploit every process open to them to achieve their desired endpoints. It becomes impossible to challenge a judicial authority that acts as if the governing law doesn’t exist, simply ignoring it.

A review found that out of thousands of ICE detention cases, a significant number of judges rejected broad ICE detention policies, while only a handful upheld them. The evident trend shows that the justices have disregarded provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which supports the executive branch’s authority to detain and remove illegal immigrants.

Simply relying on Supreme Court rulings won’t deter judges from engaging in procedural obstruction.

Essentially, lawlessness leads to more lawlessness. In a climate where aggressors feel emboldened to dictate terms, it’s concerning for lower courts to side with these aggressors while managing to dictate terms to higher courts.

If lower courts ignore the attorney general, should the president continue to defer to them when he is on solid legal ground?