U.S. Struggles in Information War Amid Ongoing Iran Conflict

As the U.S. initiates another pause in airstrikes during the ongoing conflict with Iran, it’s clear that while American forces can effectively dismantle Iran’s military capabilities, they are falling short in the information war, both in Iran and globally.

The ability of U.S. forces to strike various targets within Iran, as well as its allies such as the Houthis in Yemen, is evident. Conventional military assessments indicate that Iran is suffering significant losses. Nevertheless, an increasing number of domestic and international observers perceive that Tehran is managing to hold its ground against the United States. What’s going on?

I mean, it seems Iran has managed to gain an upper hand in the information war, effectively navigating the global media landscape in ways that Washington has not.

This disparity arises in part because numerous senior officials in the U.S. government still view television merely as a documentation tool for events, rather than recognizing it as a battleground in its own right. The Defense Department appears to have forgotten the lessons of the 1991 Desert Storm-era media victories, ignoring the imperative for public support both domestically and abroad. The meager media outreach can resemble a bureaucratic attitude akin to ‘let them eat cake.’

This approach might just carry through to the midterm elections when Iranian influence efforts could inadvertently sway public opinion against the U.S.

As noted, Iran has been adept in the information warfare arena, far surpassing Washington’s efforts.

American military strategists often cling to outdated notions, viewing war through a lens rooted in Clausewitz’s theory: that war is merely a continuation of political dialogue through violence. Yet, this perspective fails to account for the rapid-fire dissemination of information in today’s world, where images can travel globally in seconds, and the implications of such visuals can overshadow even significant military developments.

I’ve come to refer to this style of engagement as “SOFTWAR”: a term describing the strategic manipulation of global media to alter a society’s perception of reality. Since the early 1990s, I’ve been instructing students at U.S. military schools about this type of conflict alongside a few colleagues, but, unfortunately, adaptation has been minimal.

Meanwhile, Iran has adapted its entire military and intelligence frameworks to this model since at least 2003, even appropriating the term “SOFTWAR” in its own communications.

Iran’s strategic media approach explains why, despite the U.S. spending vast amounts on military operations, Iran continues to conduct drone and missile attacks unabated. In reality, Washington is working with outdated strategies from the Cold War against an adversary that’s built itself for the information age.

Iran’s theocratic regime is waging a multi-faceted asymmetric war across various domains, including land, sea, air, and information. While its military losses hinder direct retaliation against U.S. forces, its selected targets increasingly prioritize global media impact rather than battlefield effectiveness: think of oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz or facilities in Kuwait and Qatar. Such actions create eye-catching headlines.

Iran expertly times its more symbolic attacks to coincide with American prime-time news slots, aiming not just to inflict damage but to shape the narrative surrounding the conflict both domestically and internationally.

On another front, Iranian propagandists have their sights set on younger American audiences disillusioned with the Trump administration. They even utilize AI to generate engaging videos, attempting to bridge divides among American factions and weaken support for U.S. military actions.

When military officials in Iran speak publicly, they are carefully staged: sitting at desks adorned with the Iranian flag, impeccably dressed, and looking directly into the camera. This approach, while simple, commands attention and conveys authority. It’s all about the presentation—viewers, even those who don’t speak Farsi, pick up on the intended messages of discipline and resistance.

Conversely, U.S. military spokespeople often miss the mark. Take General Dan Caine, for example; while he’s knowledgeable and capable, his demeanor at press briefings often feels more like a squadron commander going through notes than a leader addressing millions of viewers at home.

He’d be more effective if he engaged the camera directly, maintaining eye contact with the audience rather than addressing just a few folks in the room.

Similarly, Admiral Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, appears in camouflage uniforms that prioritize stealth over authority. When he’s too far from the camera, viewers can’t even read his expressions. His informal demeanor might resonate with Congress, but it likely fails to intimidate adversaries.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, well-versed in media dynamics, is underutilizing his skills. He needs to communicate clearly and convey the immediate realities of the situation to the public, not simply speak in abstract terms.

Sadly, many American officials are still viewing communication on television as secondary, when in fact, it’s crucial to warfare. They might deserve an F for their information warfare strategies and a long stint in detention, if you will.

This situation has to change. Now. By focusing solely on military targets, the U.S. is inadvertently aiding Tehran by leaving its domestic broadcasting intact. The state-controlled Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting continues to disseminate a singular perspective on the conflict, effectively saturating the Iranian populace with propaganda while the regime has long restricted internet access.

The U.S. may be dismantling military assets, but it fails to counteract the information narrative that gives those military actions political meaning. It’s surprising that nobody has considered targeting the state-owned broadcasting equipment to break the Iranian information monopoly.

The true source of Iran’s power lies in its public—a society that has faced oppression and significant violence against dissent for years. Unfortunately, as it stands, besides a handful of people with satellite access, the U.S. lacks a coherent plan to engage with the Iranian populace directly.

Despite having the technological capability, the U.S. military has weakened its ability to connect. The recent decommissioning of the EC-130J aircraft, the only airborne communication platform, shows a troubling trend. While deemed vulnerable, there hasn’t been any announced replacement with the same mission.

Instead, commanders could deploy drones, say, outdated Predators, for broadcasting purposes. By outfitting them to relay information directly to Iranian households, the U.S. could adapt to the current battlefield.

Operating from regions in eastern Iraq, drones could cover Tehran, broadcasting unfiltered information while concurrent airstrikes target Iranian transmitters, forcing the regime to expose their air defenses—at which point U.S. weaponry could neutralize them.

Creative real-time programming could be reinstated through the reactivation of the 1st Joint SOFTWAR Unit, a team previously disbanded but capable of rapid deployment.

Right now, while the U.S. holds the upper hand militarily, it doesn’t have a plan for communicating directly with the Iranian public at scale. It’s akin to a mechanic ignoring the engine warning but cutting the light wire instead—while it looks better, the underlying issues remain unaddressed.

The U.S. isn’t losing against Iran in military terms; it’s losing in the battle over the narrative of that military engagement.

A nation can fulfill every military aim yet still falter if its opponent frames the images, the timing, and the narrative. Information warfare isn’t a side matter; it’s the core of modern conflict. And currently, it appears that America is falling behind.

To succeed, the U.S. needs to develop a comprehensive military approach that encompasses operations on land, sea, air, and within the information realm. Information warfare should be guiding both strategy and execution, with kinetic operations serving to bolster overall influence objectives—quite the opposite of how things are currently managed. Iran already grasps this hierarchy.