Fifty years ago, Richard Nixon attempted to create a rift between China and Russia. Now, President Trump is looking to do the opposite by attempting to create a divide between Russia and China.
The strategies of both leaders make sense within their respective historical contexts.
In 1969, a conflict arose along the open border between the former Soviet Union and China.Tensions had been simmering for some time.
The Soviet Union’s 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia underscored the precariousness of a communist regime that had to navigate the Kremlin’s limitations, given its influence was not from China. For a considerable period, Mao Zedong’s China had pursued greater ideological autonomy from Moscow. Now, that autonomy had become crucial.
At that time, China was a subordinate ally. The Soviet Union stood as a major power in a bipolar world split between capitalism and communism, democracy and autocracy.
Conversely, in the present day, China and Russia have swapped roles, with Russia now being the lesser partner. Russia’s influence has contracted, and many prior client states have aligned themselves with the West after the Cold War. The potential for Ukraine to become another such state contributed to Putin’s decision to invade.
Already in a weakened position, Russia’s situation has worsened due to significant strategic errors in Ukraine. Presently, it is under pressure from sanctions, isolation, and a deteriorating image (once regarded as a formidable power); it’s evident that the cost and causes of its suffering are alarming.
China, as the second-largest economy with the world’s most populous nation, now plays a leading role alongside Russia. It seeks to extend its influence beyond borders. Beijing’s agreement involving Hong Kong has escalated conflicts surrounding Taiwan while also intensifying tensions as part of its aim to establish hegemony in the South Pacific and Asia.
Moreover, China’s ambitions extend beyond military action; it also utilizes economic power to further its aims—highlighted by initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to fortify its position near critical locations like the Panama Canal.
Fifty years prior, President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger recognized a similar divide between China and Russia.
Initially,secret meetings began in July (with another follow-up in October) 1971, leading to discussions with Chinese communist leaders. These early discussions set the groundwork for Nixon’s 1972 summit with Mao Zedong and other Chinese communist officials.
Today—albeit significantly less than during the Soviet era—China has gathered a coalition of states to confront US dominance, including Russia, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea, and Iran. Trump evidently perceives a way to realign Russia from this trajectory.
He views Russia as an immediate danger, particularly to Europe, thereby anticipating a leadership role in the regional conflicts and weighing the burden of its defense.
Furthermore, Trump clearly considers China a significant global threat, exceeding that of Russia. While Russia has struggled to exert its influence beyond its borders, China is actively seeking to expand its reach worldwide and is frequently successful.
Trump recognizes the opening presented by Russia’s weaknesses. Putin’s miscalculations related to Ukraine have drained Russia of essential resources (as evidenced by its reliance on North Korean forces), funds, and standing. While Russia is clearly not the Soviet Union of fifty years ago, severing it from China would still represent a substantial setback for Beijing.
Despite its limitations, Russia continues to serve as China’s most formidable military ally, complicating the West’s pursuits. Removing Russia from its alignment with China would further isolate Beijing.
This shift would also hasten the decline of China’s foreign policy. For instance, its ally Iran has appeared particularly vulnerable in recent years, with its influence waning—highlighting issues like Bashar Assad’s failing position in Syria, the Huthis in Yemen, Hezbola in Lebanon, and, of course, Hamas in Gaza.
This does not imply that Trump is akin to Nixon or that Kissinger’s approach is diminished. His highly unconventional style often disregards diplomatic protocols and can sometimes appear rash. However, his approach should not hinder recognition of his understanding of the differences in the threat levels posed by Russia (regional) and China (global) and how to divide the two.
The channel of opportunity that Trump identifies resembles the one Nixon viewed fifty years ago. His methods are distinctly his own, but they shouldn’t detract from the fact that his strategic vision reflects Nixon’s, albeit in a reversed manner.
JT Young is an author of books including “Unprecedented Attack: How Big is the Government of America’s Socialists Leaving?.” He has over 30 years of experience in Congress, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, and with a Fortune 20 Company.
