The Ongoing U.S.-Iran Relationship: Lessons from 1979
On November 4, 1979, while I was stationed as a duty officer in Bad Kreuznach, West Germany, a message reached us: radical Iranian revolutionaries had taken over the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding numerous Americans hostage. My role was to relay this information to Maj. Gen. William J. Livesey, keeping him updated on the unfolding crisis.
No one expected the gravity of the situation. It was the inception of a geopolitical issue that would extend beyond the Cold War, affecting seven U.S. presidencies, and feel unresolved even 50 years later.
The embassy takeover was more than just an embarrassment. At that time, the U.S. lacked a military command in the Persian Gulf; CENTCOM was nonexistent. The hostage crisis, compounded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shortly after, solidified America’s vulnerabilities. In March 1980, President Carter formed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which eventually evolved into CENTCOM by January 1983. This incident not only humiliated superpowers; it completely transformed how America organizes military action in the Middle East.
The Fragile Ceasefire Negotiations
Now, as Washington deliberates a tentative 60-day memorandum of understanding aimed at extending a ceasefire, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and laying groundwork for nuclear talks, I often reflect on that night in 1979. Although the specifics have evolved, the fundamental dynamics remain unchanged.
Today’s headlines revolve around ceasefires, penalties, and Iran’s substantial stockpile of enriched uranium. Those issues matter, sure, but they aren’t the crux of the matter.
“Survival is not a byproduct of Iran’s strategy; it is the strategy.” This distinction separates genuine analysis from wishful thinking that has clouded U.S. policies on Iran for decades.
Ineffective Strategies Over the Years
For nearly half a century, U.S. administrations have attempted to shift Iran’s behavior through a variety of means like deterrence, diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, and even military force. Yet, despite seven different presidential approaches, the Iranian regime endures.
The clerical government has weathered numerous challenges, including the Iran-Iraq war, crippling economic sanctions, domestic uprisings, and targeted military operations. Throughout, Tehran’s fundamental objectives have remained consistent: survival.
The Perspective of the Iranian Leadership
This may not strike you as particularly impressive, but it’s critical. Understanding that survival is Iran’s primary strategy is key to analyzing its behavior accurately—it’s a point of confusion that has led to flawed U.S. policy for years.
Washington frequently misjudges Iranian intentions, not due to a lack of information but rather a failure of imagination. Americans tend to frame Iran as a typical nation-state, driven by tangible geopolitical interests. We mistakenly believe that if sufficient pressure is applied, Iran will join the international community. This assumption has persisted for 47 years without evidence to support it.
The Iranian clerics view themselves not as custodians of a nation-state, but as keepers of a revolutionary ethos that began in 1979. While they may appreciate sanctions relief or diplomatic legitimacy, neither supersedes the necessity of regime survival.
The Long Game and Iran’s Resilience
In my book, I posited that America’s main adversaries think in terms of decades rather than election cycles. They adapt to setbacks and pursue strategic positioning long-term. This applies to China, Russia, and notably, Iran as well. Dictatorships often demonstrate a type of patience that democratic governments struggle to match, since they aren’t bound by electoral pressures. Tehran has shown this for 50 years now.
This prolonged perception explains current negotiation trends. Every new proposal sparks cautious optimism, only to be met with conditions and shifting demands. Iran’s leadership has already indicated a strict stance on nuclear enrichment, insisting it as an “inalienable right.” Discussions may touch on managing enriched material, but the underlying principle of enrichment remains a significant sticking point.
Insights from Historical Patterns
Looking back, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limited Iran’s enrichment to 3.67% while allowing only a 300-kilogram stockpile. Initially, Tehran accepted these terms but later exploited the sanctions relief to bolster its regional influence. After the U.S. exited the agreement in 2018, Iran progressively increased its enrichment levels, ultimately exceeding 60% until military efforts intervened.
The core lesson isn’t just about policy structure; it’s about ideology. The Islamic Republic was never designed to engage as a conventional state; it exists as a revolution with a divine mission, one that persists through its leadership. When any new agreement is formed, Iran will seek to exploit every facet of it. Should the nations falter, Iran will rebuild and re-establish itself as a formidable force in opposition to the U.S.
The Need for Realism in Diplomacy
While pursuing diplomacy is preferable to engaging in another military operation, it requires a realistic analysis of the situation. The true risk lies in assuming that the Iranian government’s basic calculations have altered.
The Islamic Republic’s actions throughout nine U.S. administrations, notably during wars and intense sanctioning, do not suggest any fundamental changes to its position. The same regime that stormed our embassy in 1979 has continued to prioritize its survival against American pressure.
Nearly five decades later, the U.S. finds itself up against the very same adversary. Sure, some factors like names and weaponry have changed, but the core objectives of the Iranian regime remain unmet. Now, once more, Iran is playing the long game with the current discussions merely delaying the inevitable next round. The pivotal question is whether the U.S. will approach negotiations with pragmatism or fall back into old patterns of commitment that have historically proved unproductive.


