China has been developing its ground-based missile capabilities for decades, largely to edge the U.S. out of the ongoing Taiwan conflict. U.S. officials have expressed concerns that China can now threaten key military locations throughout the Western Pacific.
Amidst this backdrop, Washington is hurrying to improve its own artillery. Analysts, however, caution that the ground aspect of the U.S.-China standoff is perhaps the most underestimated and could prove crucial. Discussions with military experts indicate that success won’t hinge on troop movements but rather on missile reach, access to bases, and the U.S. military’s endurance during initial conflict stages, which might begin even before aircraft are deployed.
Seth Jones from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlighted that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force is boosting its arsenal of various missiles. They now possess the capability to launch them across significant stretches of the Pacific.
Chinese officials have long struggled with the notion of matching U.S. air dominance directly. Instead, they have built a considerable amount of ground-based firepower aimed at neutralizing U.S. military installations and preventing American aircraft and ships from engaging in combat.
According to Eric Heginbotham of MIT, there’s recognition in China that achieving air superiority through direct confrontations is unlikely. Their workaround, then, is to develop many ground-based launch systems to deploy missiles effectively.
This has resulted in what is now the largest array of theater-range missiles globally, backed by underground facilities and rapid-launch capabilities aimed at overwhelming U.S. defenses.
Despite China’s missile numbers, U.S. forces maintain certain advantages, particularly in targeting and durability. The U.S. integrates its missile systems within a broader surveillance network that the Chinese military still has not managed to replicate, relying on various technologies honed over decades of experience.
Jones pointed out that China hasn’t engaged in warfare since the 1970s, which presents several challenges for their operational readiness compared to the U.S., which is currently creating a task force in the Pacific to enhance integration across multiple domains like cyber and electronic warfare.
However, China’s defense industry grapples with inefficiencies and quality issues, largely due to its reliance on state-owned enterprises, Jones remarked.
Nonetheless, the U.S. also faces a pressing challenge regarding its missile supplies. Jones noted that if a conflict over Taiwan were to persist for about a week, the U.S. could quickly deplete its long-range munitions.
The U.S. government is addressing this by ramping up production of various artillery systems. New Army developments, ranging from advanced launchers to long-range hypersonic missiles, are designed to threaten China’s military from significant distances.
Heginbotham indicated that significant changes in military acquisitions are taking place, with a dramatic increase in anti-ship missiles planned.
If plans materialize, by 2035, the U.S. aims to have approximately 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles, a substantial increase from around 2,500 currently.
China’s strategy focuses on targeting U.S. military bases early in a conflict, while the U.S. employs layered air defenses to protect vital assets effectively. This includes using destroyers equipped with various interceptors and systems designed to engage threats at various ranges.
Heginbotham emphasized the need for the U.S. to diversify its defense capabilities, advocating for more affordable missile defense options.
U.S. launchers in the Pacific will contend with significant Chinese surveillance and missile strikes. After a lengthy period prioritizing counterterrorism, the Pentagon is shifting back to essentials like deception and maneuver capabilities crucial for survival in the early phases of missile warfare.
If the U.S. becomes involved in the Taiwan situation, it faces the critical decision of whether to target missile sites within China, a move that could escalate tensions significantly.
Heginbotham pointed out that while it’s feasible to defend Taiwan without striking inside China, forgoing such action might come at a cost. The dilemma lies in how to navigate this potential escalation while still being effective.
The reality is that conflicts today must be handled with restraint, yet restraint could also give China the opportunity to continue its offensive actions. As Heginbotham put it, conflicts in the nuclear era come with limitations that require careful negotiation of responses.
The ground conflict between the U.S. and China won’t see traditional military maneuvers but instead will revolve around missile warfare, influenced heavily by geography and alliances. In this scenario, the ability to control launch, movement, and deployment will be paramount.
Ultimately, the U.S. must strive to maintain a stock of long-range missiles, safeguard necessary bases, and ensure launch platforms remain operational amidst threats. On the other hand, China faces hurdles in cohesively managing its extensive missile capabilities, challenging its prospects in coordination and real-world combat efficiency.
The outcome of a potential Pacific conflict may hinge on which side can launch, relocate, and strike earliest and effectively.
