U.S.-Iran Naval Tensions: An Ongoing Challenge

ISLAMABAD — President Trump stated that the U.S. had “defeated Iran’s navy,” referencing a series of attacks since late February that have taken out warships, submarines, and crucial military sites. However, despite these actions, Iran managed to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz.

Experts pointed out that operations in the narrow waters of the Strait are less about large vessels and more about swarming tactics.

According to defense analysts and U.S. officials, Iran’s “mosquito fleet,” which consists of numerous small fast-attack boats, along with drones and coastal missiles, has shown it can still disrupt global oil trade, even after U.S. strikes heavily damaged much of Iran’s military capabilities.

“We call them ‘mosquito swarms’ because they’re small and bothersome, yet still impactful,” remarked Alex Prisas, a former Pentagon official and Atlantic Council fellow. “They can really disrupt activities and make things uncomfortable.” He also pointed out that with “thousands of ships” operating in this vital shipping lane, even a minor threat can have significant repercussions.

Trump acknowledged on Monday that, while the U.S. military had eliminated Iran’s conventional naval forces, it didn’t target small vessels, which were deemed less of a threat.

“Iran’s Navy is at the bottom of the ocean, 158 ships completely gone,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “We didn’t attack what they called a small number of ‘fast attack ships’ because we didn’t see them as much of a threat.” Yet, these “small” boats soon began to create substantial issues.

According to U.S. Navy assessments, Iran has been developing a dual naval strategy over the years. One part consists of a traditional fleet with frigates and submarines, many of which are now damaged. The other is a covert force operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, specifically tailored for operations in the Persian Gulf.

This second force is becoming increasingly prominent—it’s inexpensive, easy to replace, and designed to overwhelm adversaries.

Defense analysts, alongside a report from the Congressional Research Service, indicate that this fleet features thousands of small, high-speed boats capable of reaching speeds of 40 to 60 knots, armed with machine guns, rockets, and, in some cases, anti-ship missiles and mines.

Since February 28, U.S. officials have confirmed that the American military has either destroyed or degraded significant portions of Iran’s conventional military, including larger vessels and missile systems. Yet, the smaller, more agile drones and fast boats remain hard to eliminate due to their size and mobility.

Pritsas commented that “we literally bombed them alive…80 to 90 percent of their missiles, industrial equipment, drones—all gone.” He indicated that the remnants of Iran’s navy don’t need to fully block the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, creating an environment where every trip feels risky could be sufficient.

“Even today, they could create a situation where the U.S. feels pressured to attack three ships, discouraging their owners from navigating through the strait,” Pritsas explained.

Pritsas emphasized that contemporary naval warfare doesn’t require outright control of the sea, especially in confined areas; it’s more about making usage seem too perilous.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, around one-fifth of the world’s oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and even temporary disruptions can have significant implications for the global economy. This underscores an influential strategy the Iranian government is currently utilizing.

A complete blockade would necessitate extensive military action, which Iran isn’t looking to execute. Rather, they have opted for low-cost, effective methods that are challenging to counter.

“They realized they didn’t need to lay mines in the channel,” Pritsas noted. “A few drones and small boats can create a perilous choke point in this crucial waterway without permanently closing it, causing havoc in the markets.”

Unlike traditional warships, these smaller vessels are hard to detect with radar, easy to conceal along the Iranian coast, and affordable enough that sacrificing them doesn’t equate to a strategic loss.

For U.S. military planners, the real concern might not be what Iran’s navy leaves in its wake, but rather what it is willing to endure.

“The Iranians are not deterred,” Pritsas cautioned. “They view this as a life-or-death situation; they’re prepared to face significant losses, even 60 to 70 percent of their military, as long as they continue to exist.”

This outlook complicates achieving a decisive victory, since battlefield losses don’t necessarily equate to surrender. “So, the key question for the U.S. is, where is the breaking point?” he remarked. “And so far, we haven’t identified it.”