The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 against a drug trafficker who was fighting his conviction by arguing that expert testimony by special agents of the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) violated the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In 2020, Delilah Diaz was stopped at a checkpoint on the US-Mexico border. Border Patrol agents searched her vehicle and found more than 54 pounds of methamphetamine. Diaz was then charged with importing methamphetamine, which required federal prosecutors to prove she knew she was importing drugs into the US through the border.
At trial, Diaz claimed he was unaware that methamphetamine was hidden in the car, but federal prosecutors called HSI Special Agent Andrew Flood to testify as an expert witness in the case, arguing that drug traffickers would not typically entrust large amounts of drugs to couriers who didn’t know they were carrying them.
Diaz argued that Flood’s testimony violated the Federal Rules of Evidence because he was expressing opinions about her mental state and condition. The court allowed Flood to testify that most couriers knew they were moving large amounts of drugs in similar cases.
A jury convicted Diaz in that case, but Diaz appealed, arguing that Flood’s testimony violated the Federal Rules of Evidence. The appeals court upheld the conviction.
On Thursday, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the majority opinion, holding that Flood’s expert testimony was not an opinion and therefore did not violate the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In that case, Agent Flood did not opine on whether Diaz himself was knowingly transporting methamphetamine, but instead testified that most drug mules knew about it. That opinion does not necessarily portray Diaz’s mental state. Because Agent Flood did not opine on whether Diaz himself knowingly transported methamphetamine, his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b). [Emphasis added]
Diaz’s counterargument is unconvincing.She first alleges that Agent Flood, when he opined that most couriers knew they were transporting drugs, in effect opined as to whether she was knowingly transporting drugs. An opinion about most mules is not an opinion about all mules. Investigator Flood argued that Diaz was part of a group of people who may or may not have certain mental conditions. Thus, the ultimate question of Diaz’s mental condition was left to the jury to decide. Next, relying on the dictionary definition of “about,” Diaz argues that Rule 704(b)’s phrase “express an opinion about” includes all testimony that “relates to” whether a defendant was in a particular mental state. But the surrounding context of that sentence makes it clear that Rule 704(b) only addresses conclusions about a defendant’s mental state. Rule 704(a) further supports the narrow scope of testimony prohibited by Rule 704(b). Because Rule 704(b) is an “exception” to Rule 704(a), Rule 704(b) can be understood to cover only the subset of testimony that Rule 704(a) expressly permits: opinion testimony involving final issues. In Diaz’s interpretation, the exception swallows the rule. [Emphasis added]
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined Thomas in a concurring opinion, with Justice Neil Gorsuch dissenting, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
This incident Diaz v. United Statesno. 23-14 In the Supreme Court of the United States.
John Binder is a reporter for Breitbart News. Email him at jbinder@breitbart.com. Follow him on Twitter. here.
