President Trump’s choice to cut back on national security council staff has ignited protests from media insiders and former NSC personnel from the Biden administration. Critics argue that Trump’s actions are akin to “removing some of the brain” of his government, potentially leaving the U.S. ill-equipped to handle emerging crises.
For instance, had the NSC comprehended the dangers of a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan and coordinated a more strategic exit, their arguments might hold more weight.
Biden has also downsized the National Security Council, which had around 400 members during Barack Obama’s presidency. However, it’s notable that the Obama administration struggled to prevent chemical attacks by Bashar Assad against Syrian rebels.
Additionally, there were only about 200 NSC members under George W. Bush, who were criticized for failing to synchronize efforts between the military and defense sectors. This lack of coordination contributed to the U.S.’s challenges in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Interestingly, George H.W. Bush, who successfully navigated complex foreign and security policies—including a decisive victory over Saddam Hussein—utilized fewer than 60 NSC experts. His advisor, Brent Scowcroft, is often acclaimed as one of the most effective national security advisors in the post-World War II era.
Bill Clinton’s NSC managed to coordinate effective policies, like the expansion of NATO and ending the Balkan War, with a NSC staff that, despite being 50% larger than that of George H.W. Bush, still had fewer than 100 officials—less than half the size of Biden’s current team.
This comparison of staff sizes brings to light the notion that the number of NSC members may not be as significant as their roles and the coherence of leadership that shapes the agency, or the absence of it.
For both Bush and Clinton, the NSC staff acted as true coordinators, enabling the president to make high-level policy decisions while allowing department heads to manage their sectors. In contrast, Biden, like Obama before him, has attempted to take on operational responsibilities, leading to a form of micro-management in foreign and national security policies. Obviously, it’s impractical for nearly 400 staff to effectively manage an agency with several hundred personnel.
Trump’s strategy of streamlining the NSC staff comes with its own set of risks. It’s not merely the quantity of staff that matters; it’s about how their roles are defined and how well they’re prepared.
Laura Rumer, a conspiracy theorist and critic, has raised concerns that some capable NSC members have been overlooked by the president. Yet, it shouldn’t be assumed that those remaining are entirely inept.
Moreover, it has become apparent that if the primary agency heads in Trump’s second term work collaboratively, like Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Scowcroft did, they could effectively implement alternative policy approaches.
Some contend that Marco Rubio’s dual roles as Secretary of State and acting national security advisor might elevate the State Department’s influence in making policy. Ironically, many who voice these concerns were those who felt the State Department had previously been marginalized by the Pentagon. While Rubio may not have the stature of Henry Kissinger—and some of Trump’s older critics didn’t like Kissinger either—he could still ensure that State’s priorities receive the same level of attention as those of Defense or Treasury, which is, honestly, not a bad scenario.
In the end, some NSC staff members suggest they only echo what Trump wants to hear; that may not be entirely off-base. However, the smaller staff doesn’t inherently limit the views of the agency head. The leader presents the president with the options they believe to be best suited to each situation.
Ultimately, the NSC staff, along with its director, is there to support not just this president but all presidents. Their role is to facilitate the success of his policies. While their views on which policies will achieve his goals might differ, the ultimate objective remains the same. You can question the wisdom of Trump’s decision-making, yet, like all predecessors, he ultimately holds the final say.
And the NSC staff’s responsibility isn’t about overshadowing cabinet members or key agency heads; rather, it’s to ensure the president has a well-rounded array of viable options before making a decision, whatever that might entail.
