The Iran War had been at a standstill for quite some time, but then an Iran-aligned rebel faction surged through Yemen, creating a new front in the conflict and threatening a crucial chokepoint for global shipping. This shift highlights the shortcomings of President Trump’s strategy in the Middle East and suggests that his efforts to alter the regional power dynamics have backfired in unexpected ways.
In a rapid 36-hour campaign, Ansar Allah—commonly referred to as the Houthis—captured around 2,000 square kilometers of land in early September. This included significant portions of Yemen’s coastline that faces the vital oil and trade route known as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the port city of Mokha and Perim Island. Additionally, the Houthis managed to disable a major Saudi oil pipeline, the East-West Pipeline, via a drone strike.
Despite warnings since the conflict’s onset that the Houthis might escalate tensions by seizing key islands in the Southern Red Sea and effectively blocking the Bab el-Mandeb, which could overwhelm global oil markets, Saudi Arabia seems to have been unprepared. It appears that both Washington and Riyadh may have exacerbated the situation due to a lack of coordination and foresight.
A senior source from Yemen mentioned to CNN that the Houthis “deployed everything they had—waves of fighters along with their available ballistic missiles and other weapons.” They had expected support from United States Central Command (CENTCOM), which they believed was closely monitoring the situation and that Saudi air reinforcement was imminent.
“But the air support never materialized,” the source stated. “And Mokha has now fallen.”
A different regional source shared with CNN that the inability to halt the Houthis can’t be solely blamed on the Yemeni government; Americans and Saudis share the responsibility.
“This is a disaster made in Washington, DC and Riyadh,” the source argued. “There wasn’t a single airstrike by Saudi forces throughout the day despite constant updates. It’s an epic blunder by both Saudi and American officials.”
Mohammed al-Basha, who has previously consulted for the U.S. on Arabian Peninsula issues, suggested that the Yemeni government also displayed a chaotic response and deserves some criticism as well.
“I think everyone knew the Houthis would push towards the west coast. The signs were unmistakable,” he noted. “There’s no unified command structure in Yemen.”
Ahead of the Houthi offensive, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman contacted President Trump on September 10, asking for U.S. military strikes against the rebels, according to Axios. However, Trump declined, with officials stating that the administration wasn’t planning any immediate action.
That said, the U.S. isn’t completely turning its back on the Saudis. Instead of direct military action, the U.S. continues to provide Riyadh with intelligence and targeting information, and has stationed around 200 military advisers in the kingdom. Admiral Bradley Cooper, head of CENTCOM, also visited Saudi Arabia prior to the Houthi attacks.
“The United States is focused on safeguarding our core national security interests—like ensuring free navigation in the Red Sea—while empowering our regional partners to lead in managing and resolving security challenges,” a senior administration official mentioned.
During Trump’s second term, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia maintained a close strategic alliance, marked by significant defense agreements, investment commitments, and intelligence cooperation. In 2025, Trump officially upgraded Saudi Arabia to major non-NATO ally status, facilitating easier arms transfers and increasing defense collaboration. The aim has always been to elevate the Saudis as a dominant power capable of controlling the Middle East, allowing the U.S. to reduce its involvement and redirect focus toward Asia and concerns regarding China.
With the recent Houthi advance, Riyadh’s expectation for a military bail-out from the U.S. has been dashed, and America’s “security guarantees” now seem much less dependable. Even with new investment promises and arms sales, including the provision of American F-35s, the Saudis still struggle to manage the Houthis independently.
While the Trump administration is hesitant to engage in direct strikes on the Houthis again—having previously bombed them in 2025 only to later concede—the possibility that the Houthis could close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait looms large. Such an event would have serious implications for Saudi oil exports and, consequently, global oil and gas prices. The U.S. may feel compelled to intervene—as a response to pressures—even without the Houthis attacking American ships, especially ahead of the midterm elections.
It seems that another layer in the Iran War could be approaching sooner than anticipated. Moreover, Trump’s attempts to rebalance power in the Middle East might be backfiring, leaving Saudi Arabia in a precarious position, significantly weakened by a rebel group.
