Russia’s Cultural Diplomacy Agency Plans Foreign Aid Program
Yevgeny Primakov, who leads Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s agency for cultural diplomacy, announced on Tuesday that the government intends to initiate a foreign aid program inspired by the U.S. International Development Agency (USAID).
Officially named “The Independent State Department’s Federal Agency,” Rossotrudnichestvo operates as part of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was created in 2008 with the aim of increasing Russia’s influence globally.
The agency’s goal is to promote Moscow’s perspectives on cultural and humanitarian issues. However, many nations don’t regard Moscow as a source of humanitarian guidance. Critics have labeled Rossotrudnichestvo as primarily a vehicle for Kremlin propaganda and espionage, particularly as the European Union has noted threats to the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine from various Russian entities.
Primakov acknowledged the financial challenges Russia faces in meeting the spending levels seen in the USAID model. He pointed out that the project, which he described as “misguided and financially irresponsible,” could yield “significant results,” even in countries like Finland.
To provide some context, USAID’s annual budget stands at around $40 billion, while Finland allocates approximately 1.2 billion euros (or about $1.4 billion) for development support each year. In contrast, Rossotrudnichestvo’s budget is roughly 5.5 billion rubles (around $70 million), with only a fraction currently directed towards foreign development initiatives.
Primakov envisions a revamped operational model for his agency, allowing greater financial flexibility without needing direct governmental consent for every project. He stated, “We live in an active world, so we must be active too.”
Interestingly, Primakov’s newfound enthusiasm for a USAID-like mission seems at odds with Russia’s decision to ban USAID back in 2012. He appears unperturbed about using development funds to garner political clout abroad, while still promoting a façade of “soft power” to fill gaps left by reduced USAID activities.
“We must be a significant force globally that safeguards our national interests and competes with other nations,” he remarked.
Primakov has indicated that if Azerbaijan receives the budget boost he seeks, it could be an early focus for his initiatives. He mentioned that the Russian community in Azerbaijan expresses a desire to show more allegiance to their homeland, framing it as a mutual benefit.
Still, there are reasons to believe that sentiments within Azerbaijan could shift against Russia. Primakov’s aspirations—like increasing product distributions—might not wear well if the reception turns sour.
He expressed concern about maintaining Moscow’s influence over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), particularly as tensions arise following the invasion of Ukraine, an original member of the CIS. Azerbaijan, in particular, is growing increasingly dissatisfied as a member.
Primakov noted that losing influence in neighboring countries would be far more concerning than in less critical regions. He acknowledged that while Russia’s senior partners, particularly in China’s orbit, are likely to seek opportunities for extending their soft power, China has a significant advantage. It is considerably wealthier and more adept at expanding its influence worldwide while already investing in foreign aid.
Moreover, there are claims that China has recently aimed to replace some small-scale USAID programs, although typically in nations where it has existing strategic ties or interests. This follows a backdrop of dissatisfaction among the Chinese populace regarding foreign aid expenditures while their economy struggles. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party is inclined to offer substantial loans via initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) rather than commit significant resources toward foreign aid.
